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Economists  have  greatly  criticized  regulations  that  impose  uniform  environmental
standards on plants which may differ in terms both of their marginal abatement cost and
marginal damage functions. Such a critic ignores however that the implementation of the
standards may vary significantly across plants thus giving rise  in fact to non-uniform
standards. The purpose of this  paper is to  analyze the determinants of the regulator's
monitoring  activities,  and the  factors which explains the decision to  inspect or not to
inspect a plant's  environmental performance. We show that regulators are sensitive to
local environmental damages in their decision to inspect specific plants and that greater
inspection effort, ceteris paribus, is allocated towards those plants whose emissions are
likely to generate a higher level of damages. Hence, local monitoring and enforcement of
national  standards  effectively  determine  the  price  of  pollution  in  each  area.  While
national  standards,  as  defined  by  regulations  and  legislation  are  uniform,  the
implementation  of  those  standards  is  in  fact  a  function  of  local  conditions.  Ceteris
paribus, this finding indicates that local enforcers may redirect resources in a way that
may  approximate  optimal behavior.  A clear policy  implication of this  finding  is the
following:  Ignoring  that  these  trade-offs  are  taking  place  at  the  local  levels  may
undermine and in fact render ineffective regulatory and policy reforms targeted solely at
the national level. It is interesting to note that a similar result has been observed in China
(see Wang and Wheeler, Policy Research Working Paper  1644). We would expect this
finding to  be  robust  to  other  countries  and  institutional  settings.  This  finding  gives
support to the public interest theory of regulation which views the regulator as an agent
whose objective is to maximize social welfare.
On the other hand, we also show that the behavior of the regulator is also a function of
variables that may not be directly related to abatement cost and damages. In particular,
we show that variables pertaining to local labor market conditions have an impact on the
monitoring  strategy  adopted  by  the  regulator.  This  result  provides  support  to  the
economic theory of regulation which views the regulator as an agent whose behavior can
best be explained by assuming that it seeks to maximize its political support.
iI1.  Introduction
Economists  have  greatly  criticized  environmental  regulations  that  impose  on
polluters uniform environmental standards since such standards ignore that plants face
non-uniform  marginal  abatement  cost,  as  well  as  non-uniform  marginal  damage
functions.  However,  the  presence  of  uniform  standards  does  not  necessarily  imply
uniform compliance with the standards. The nature of the monitoring and enforcement
activities performed by the regulator ultimately determines the extent of pollution control
undertaken by the plants and their level of compliance with the regulation.' If compliance
with the terms of the regulation imposes any net cost on a plant, its behavior is likely to
diverge from the desired one unless the cost of compliance is smaller than the expected
cost of non-compliance. 2
It has been increasingly recognized that resources devoted to the monitoring of the
regulated community and the enforcement of environmental standards are insufficient,
and that these activities are seriously lacking. 3 The regulator therefore has to allocate its
limited resources to perform a small number of compliance activities. Silverman (1990)
writes: "Because of limited resources and the resulting need to establish priorities, each
EPA program  at agency headquarters  in  Washington D.C. has developed  compliance
monitoring plans and enforcement response policies. These strategies generally direct the
most intensive efforts to those segments of the regulated community most likely to be in
non-compliance" (p. 95; italics ours). In the context, the use of the word "generally" takes
Russell (1990) defines monitoring as "checking up on whether those covered by
the law and regulations are doing (or not doing) what is required of (or forbidden
to) them." (p. 243) Enforcement is defined as "taking actions that force violators
to mend their ways and that provide visible examples to encourage others in the
regulated population to maintain desired behavior to avoid a similar fate." (p. 243)
Penalties for non-compliance may take various forms, including legal costs, fines,
loss of reputation, etc. For more details, see Dewees (1990), Hamilton (1995),
Lanoie and Laplante (1994), and Muoghalu et al. (1990).
Russell (1990) writes: "What is missing is a commitment of resources to checking
up on whether those covered by the law and regulations are doing (or not doing)
what is required of (or forbidden) them" (p. 243). See also General Accounting
Office (1993), and O'Connor (1994).
1a special importance since it represents an implicit recognition that universal compliance
may not  be the  objective of the regulator.  Similarly in  Canada, "upon evaluating the
results of the National Inspection Plan, Environment Canada found that all regulations
did not require the same level of compliance verification, and decided on a target-oriented
approach" (Canada, 1992, p. 38).
Surprisingly,  issues  pertaining  to  the  monitoring  and  enforcement  of
environmental standards has been the object of very few empirical analysis.4 Magat and
Viscusi (1990) have estimated the impact of inspections on the self-reported discharges of
biological oxygen demand (BOD) of pulp  and  paper plants  in the United States, and
found that each inspection reduces permanently reported discharges by approximately
20%. More recently, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have found that not only inspections
but also the threat of an inspection has a strong negative impact on reported emissions.
Both  analyses also  found  that  inspections  induce  more  frequent  reporting  from  the
plants. 5
Given  that  inspections  may  induce  plants  to  improve  their  environmental
performance, it is of interest to understand the process leading the regulator to undertake
monitoring activities. The purpose of this paper is to  analyze the determinants of the
regulator's decision to monitor (or not to monitor) a plant's  environmental performance.
In particular, we have built a measure of environmental damages to test whether or not
greater  inspection  effort,  ceteris  paribus,  is  allocated  towards  those  plants  whose
emissions are likely to generate a higher level of damages. On the other hand, we also test
4  We note, along with Cropper and Oates (1992), that most of the literature in
environmental economics simply makes the (implicit or explicit) assumption that
polluters comply with the regulation. Research effort on monitoring and
enforcement issues has been for the most part theoretical (see for example, Beavis
and Dobbs (1987), Linder and McBride (1984), and Russell et al. (1986)).
Fisheries have attracted a certain number of empirical analysis (among others, see
Furlong (1991), and Sutinen and Andersen (1985)).
See also Feamley et al. (1995).
2whether or not the behavior of the regulator is a function of variables that may not be
directly related to abatement cost and damages. We are particularly interested in testing
whether  or  not  variables  pertaining  to  local  labor  market  conditions  (e.g.  regional
unemployment) has an impact on the monitoring strategy adopted by the regulator.
The paper most closely related to ours is Deily and Gray (1991).  6 Using solely the
economic  (or  positive)  theory  of  regulation  as  a  reference  model  (Stigler  (1971),
Peltzman (1976)), they analyze whether or not local labor market conditions affect the
enforcement  of environmental  standards. 7 In  particular,  they  analyze whether or not
EPA's  enforcement actions are a function of the probability that a plant closes as a result
of these actions instead of complying with the regulation. In a recent paper, Deily and
Gray  (1996)  also  use  the  economic  theory  of  regulation  to  model  the  regulator's
enforcement decision. As will be shown in Section III, we obtain results converse to those
obtained by Deily and Gray.  Moreover, unlike Deily and Gray (1991, 1996) who did not
perform such a test, we show that greater inspection efforts are directed towards those
plants most likely to  cause higher levels of damages. This result  lends support to  the
public interest (or normative) theory of regulation (Posner, 1974).
Given the limited number of empirical analysis in this area of research, we view
our analysis as broadening further our understanding of the regulator's  behavior with
respect  to  the  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  environmental  standards.  Our  results
indicate that unlike standards, the implementation of those standards is not uniform. To
the extent that higher expected damages lead to a greater probability of inspections, actual
standards may be closer to optimality than would suggest the regulation. Moreover, given
the specificities of our model, the current paper extends Deily and Gray's analysis (1991,
Interestingly, Deily and Gray assert that their paper is "the first empirical study of
the EPA's enforcement activity at the plant level" (p. 260).
This theory stipulates that there is a supply and demand of regulation, and that the
government chooses the amount of regulation so as to maximize its political
support.
31996) to a test of the validity of the competing theories of regulation when applied to
environmental issues.8
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss in more details our
model,  estimation  strategy,  and  the nature  of  our dataset.  We present our  results  in
Section III and conclude in Section IV.
2.  Model, estimation and dataset
(i) Model
Our purpose  is  to  analyze the  factors that  explain  the regulator's  decision  to
monitor a plant's environmental performance. Assume that a regulation is in place which
restricts  discharges  of  a  given  subset  of  industrial  polluters  (as  most  environmental
standards are industry specific). Assume moreover that limited resources are devoted to
monitoring  compliance with the regulation. How  is the regulator going to  allocate  its
monitoring  resources? As  suggested  by Silverman  (1990), the regulator  may wish to
allocate its resources to maximize the rate of compliance with the regulation. If such is an
objective, monitoring activities would obviously be a function of a plant's  compliance
history. In particular, a high frequency of non-compliance may trigger an inspection by
the  regulator.  However,  such  a  strategy  would  presume  that  compliance  is  equally
desirable regardless of the impact of a plant's  emissions on the environment. It would
ignore that  the impact of a  plant's  emissions  is a function  of the specificities  of the
environment in which they are discharged.
With respect to effluent discharges, for any given concentration of conventional
pollutants (such as BOD and total suspended solids (TSS)), the environmental impact is a
function of the flow of the effluents relative to the flow of the river in which the effluent
is discharged: ceteris paribus, the greater the river flow, the smaller the environmental
8  To our knowledge, such a test has only been performed by Kaserman et al.
(1993).
4impact. Hence, given that the impact of a unit of pollution may vary considerably across
locations, the regulator  may wish to allocate  its resources not  so much as to  increase
compliance with the regulation but  instead to  minimize environmental  damages. This
behavior would  support the public  interest (or normative) theory of regulation which,
applied  to  this  particular  instance,  would  explain  environmental  regulation  as  an
instrument that corrects market failure and increases social welfare (Posner, 1974). Given
this  interpretation of the regulation, the regulator's  monitoring  strategy would, ceteris
paribus,  be  explicitly  affected  by  the  fact  that  damages  are  heterogeneous  across
locations,  and  at  least  implicitly  would  allow  higher  discharges  (through  lower
probabilities of inspections) in locations where damages are smaller.
However, other variables may also affect the regulator's behavior. If one espouses
the economic (or positive) theory of regulation, the regulator would allocate monitoring
resources so as to maximize net political support. On this basis, Deily and Gray (1991,
1996) predict that local employment conditions would particularly influence enforcement
actions. Enforcement actions in Deily and  Gray include letters, phone calls, penalties,
enforcement  orders,  inspections,  etc.  Monitoring activities  (e.g.  inspections)  are  not
differentiated  from  enforcement  activities  (e.g.  orders  and  fines).  In  particular,  they
predict that plants in high unemployment areas would be the target of a smaller number
of enforcement actions than plants in lower unemployment areas. However, somewhat
surprisingly  they  find  that  "plants  in  high-unemployment  counties  are  facing  more
enforcement actions than fewer." (1991, p. 269).
Deily  and  Gray  (1991,  1996)  also  predict  that  large  plants  (relative  to  the
community labor force) would face a smaller number of enforcement actions since it may
prove too costly for the regulator to disrupt a large proportion of the labor force (where
the cost is measured in terms of political support). An alternative view however is that in
order to  maximize political  support, the regulator may trade-off the  support of those
concerned with environmental quality with those whose income is an important function
of the economic activity generated by the presence of a large (polluting) plant. Support
5from  an  environmentally  aware  community may  be  obtained  by  the undertaking  of
"visible" monitoring activities such as inspections, (irrespective of whether or not these
inspections give rise to enforcement actions), while  support from the group who benefits
largely from the presence of the plant may be obtained by engaging into less enforcement
actions. Hence, unlike Deily and Gray, we therefore predict that the "visibility"  of the
plants  may  affect  the  probability  that  it  being  monitored:  the  greater  the  visibility
(measured  as the  importance  of the  plant  in  the local  labor  market), the  larger the
probability of inspections.  Whether or not large plants in the local labor market face a
smaller or a larger number of monitoring actions therefore remain an empirical issue.
Following the preceding discussion, we therefore seek to explain the regulator's
monitoring activities by using a model specification which includes variables that could
support both the normative and positive theory of regulation:
MONITORING = f (LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, DAMAGE OF
POLLUTION,  COMPLIANCE, CONTROL VARIABLES)
(ii) Estimation strategy and data
For the purpose of our econometric analysis, we use plant-level monthly data from
the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. The industry is a major contributor to Quebec's
economic  activity  and  is  also  its  most  important  source  of  conventional  pollutants,
producing approximately 60% of  the total  BOD  load produced by  the manufacturing
industry in Quebec. In Canada, jurisdiction over water pollution control is shared by the
federal and provincial governments. The basis of the overlap relies on the Constitution Act
of  1867.  Insofar as water pollution is concerned, the federal government has played an
important role through its "Fisheries Act" under which it has introduced the "Pulp and Paper
Effluent Regulations" in  1971.  Similarly, the government of Quebec, pursuant to  its
"Environmental Quality Act", has introduced the "Reglement sur les fabriques de pates at
papiers" in 1981. As of May 1992, new federal and provincial regulations were introduced
for the pulp and paper industry whereby new emission standards for TSS, BOD, toxicity,
6dioxins and furans have been defined.  However, for the period covered by our sample of
data (1985-1991 inclusively), only the Quebec regulation contained standards for BOD and
TSS (and not for toxicity). These standards are uniform and apply equally to every plant in
the  industry.  A  plant's compliance  with  the  regulation is  assessed by  comparing  the
allowable discharge with the total load reported by the plant. 9 Though 60 plants were in
production over the period of analysis, a complete dataset was available for only 46 of those
plants.'0 A total of 63 sampling inspections have been performed by the regulator over the
period of analysis."1  However, due to the exclusion of  14 plants, we retain 56 of the 63
inspections.
Let us turn to the variables used to estimate the above equation. The definition,
mean, and  standard deviation of the variables are provided in Table  1. The dependent
variable, MONITORING,  is  captured by  a  sampling inspection by  the  environmental
authorities (INSP); it takes a value of 1 when there is an inspection and 0 otherwise.
9  For more details, see Laplante and Rilstone (1996).
10  Observations were missing from the monthly reports filed by the plants. In a
number of cases, the neglect to report seemed to be unsystematic. These
observations were treated as randomly missing and were replaced by forecasts
from 12th-order univariate autoregressions. This left us with 46 of the 60 plants.
As for the plants not included in our dataset, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have
shown that the failure to report does not appear to be the result of a strategic
behavior from the plants.
A sampling inspection is an inspection where the regulator sarnples the plant's
effluents and measures the content of the samples. Other types of monitoring
activities are also performed (see Magat and Viscusi (1990, p.338) for more details).
We have tried to document monitoring activities other than sampling inspections.
However, in Quebec, during the period considered, monitoring activities were
performed on a regional basis and it proved impossible to obtain comparable
information  across regions. It does remain the case that sampling inspections are the
regulator's ultimate device to assess compliance with the standard and give
credibility to the self-reporting procedure.
7TABLE 1
Variable definitions, means, and standard deviations
Variable  Definition  Mean  Standard
deviation
INSP  Number of inspections per month at  0.02  0.12
plant  i.
AGE  Number of years of production by plant  63.74  32.49
i.
UNEMPL  Unemployment rate in the economic  11.43  3.20
region  where  the plant  is located.
EMPL  Number of employees hired by the plant  5.72  8.54
divided by total employment within a
circumference of 100 km of the plant (in
thousands)  x 100.
COMPTSS  Number of months within the previous  6.79  5.00
12 months in which the plant complied
with TSS  standards.
COMPBOD  Number of months within the previous  6.74  5.05
12 months in which the plants complied
with  BOD standards.
INSPREG  Total number of inspections per year  0.98  1.14
made in the administrative region where
the plant is located, excluding
inspections  at the plant.
REGIONAL  Dummy variable equals to 1 if located
DUMMIES  in the region, 0 otherwise (Region 9 is
omitted from estimation):
Region 1  0.11  0.31
Region 2  0.13  0.34
Region 3  0.15  0.36
Region 4  0.20  0.40
Region 5  0.07  0.25
Region 6  0.13  0.34
Region 7  0.11  0.31
Region 8  0.07  0.25
Region  9  0.04  0.20
TREND  TREND = 1 for 01/1985, =2 for  42.50  24.25
02/1985,  and  so forth.
8TABLE 1 (continued)
Variable  Definition  Mean  Standard
deviation
ANNUAL  1988 is omitted for estimation.  0.14  0.35
DUMMIES
INCOME  Average annual household income  34 185  4 715
within 100 km circumference of the
plant.
ORGANO  Dummy variable to capture the presence  0.02  0.35
of organochlorides in the effluent.
Variable = I if contains; 0 otherwise.
POPUL  Population of the city if the plant's  14 551.76  21 798.72
discharges are upstream the city. It takes
a value of 0 if discharges are
downstream the city.
FLOW  Ratio of flow of effluents over flow of  0.009  0.032
river (m3/sec).
ZONE  Polytomic variable taking a value  1.5681  1.053
between 1 and 5. 1 represents a zone
where total environmental pressure on a
river is low, and 5 where it is very high.
The LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS are captured by a vector of three
variables similar to those used by Deily and Gray. First, EMPL is defined as the ratio of
employment at the plant to employment in the local labor market.  Following our previous
discussion, we expect a positive effect of this variable on the probability of an inspection:
the  larger the plant  in  the regional  labor market,  the more  visible  is  the regulator's
monitoring activities in the community. Political support may thus be more favorable from
the constituents for whom environmental protection is an important determinant of their
political support. Second, UJNEMPL is the regional unemployment rate as defined and
measured by Statistic Canada.  Third, AGE represents the age of the plant. It reflects
12  The size of the local labor market is defined as the labor force within 100 km from
the plant.
9(admittedly crudely) the costs that a plant could face if non-compliance was detected, and
therefore the potential impact on employment if a large plant is requested to reduce its
emissions. We expect that each of these last two variables will have a negative impact on
the probability of an inspection.
As  a measure of the DAMAGE OF POLLUTION, we use 4 different variables:
FLOW, ORGANO, POP, and ZONE. The variable FLOW represents the flow of the plant's
effluent relative to the river flow. Conversations with experts in the Quebec Ministry of the
Environment assured us that such a variable captures in a simple and reasonable way the
potential of a plant's effluent to cause environmental damages. We expect this variable to
have a positive impact on the probability of inspection: the larger the FLOW variable, the
greater the potential for damages, and the higher the probability of an inspection. While this
variable may capture the potential for conventional pollutants to cause damages, it ignores
that the potential for organochlorides such as dioxins and furans to cause damages may not
be  affected in a  same manner by the river flow. We have thus introduced the variable
ORGANO which takes the value I if a plant's effluents contains such pollutants.
While emissions of pollutants likely reduce water ambient quality, the damages
suffered from such reduction are a function of the various uses that can be made of the
water. Ideally, we would have liked to estimate the economic value of the portion of the
river affected by the plant's discharges and predict that the higher this value, the larger the
probability of an inspection. Given the large number of rivers in which the plants in our
sample  are  discharging,  such  an  exercise  would  not  have  been  feasible.  Following
discussion with the Ministry of the Enviromnent, we have decided to consider as a proxy
for damages, the population of the city in which the plant is located, only  to the extent that
the plant discharges its effluent upstream the location of the population (POPUL). If the
plant's outlet(s) is located downstream the city, the variable takes the value 0.13 Finally, we
13  Short of measuring the economic value of the river, we wished to estimate the
number of people living within a given distance (e.g. 15 km) downstream the
plant's discharge point(s). However, the required distance would itself have been a
10have constructed a general index of environmental pressure for each river in which pulp and
paper plants are discharging their effluents. We expect that the higher the environmental
pressure, the more damaging could be a plant's  effluents, and therefore the greater the
probability of an inspection. We first calculated the following ratio: ((industrial wastewater
discharges + domestic wastewater discharges) / flow of the river). We then have constructed
an index ZONE which gives a value between 1 and 5 to the ratio calculated above with 1
representing an area of low pressure, and 5 an area of very high pressure.
We have also included a variable INCOME which measures the average household
income within 100 km of the plant. We expect that the higher the level of income, the
greater the demand for a cleaner environment, and the larger the probability of monitoring
of the plant's environmental perfornance. It is interesting to note that this variable may give
support to both theories of regulation. Following the public interest theory of regulation,
ceteris paribus higher levels of income give rise to a higher valuation of the environmental
damages and  therefore to  a  smaller level of  optimal pollution for any  given levels of
abatement  cost.  On  the  other  hand,  following  the  economic  theory  of  regulation,
communities with higher level of income may be more adept at exercising pressure on the
regulator to reduce pollution emissions (higher demand for regulation).
COMPLIANCE is  captured  by  the  number of  months  that  the  plant  was  in
compliance with BOD and TSS standards during the last twelve months. We therefore have
two variables labeled COMPBOD and COMPTSS; they should have a negative influence
on the probability of an inspection.
As discussed previously, if the LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS variables
have a strong explanatory power, this would lend some support to the economic theory of
regulation, while if the DAMAGE OF POLLUTION and the COMPLIANCE variables
have more explanatory power, this would support the public interest theory of regulation.
function of the river flow. A dispersion model for each river would then have been
necessary to estimate the correct distance to include in the calculation for each plant.
These models are lacking.
11Finally, we  consider two  sets  of  CONTROL VARIABLES.  The  first  one  is
included to capture the differences in monitoring effort across administrative regions.  For
this purpose, we use either REGIONAL DUMMIES or, as in Deily and Gray, a variable
labeled INSPREG which measures the total number of inspections within a region in a
given year.  The second set of control variables is included to capture omitted influences
that may vary across time, but not across regions.  For instance, greater public awareness of
environmental issues through the period may have led to an increase in monitoring effort.
These influences are captured either by YEARLY DUMMIES or a TIME TREND.
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable,14  we use the probit model
for our estimations. 15 Different specifications are presented with various control variables.
Furthermore, experimentations  were conducted with different lags of the FLOW variable up
to (t-6).  The justification for this lies on the rationale that there may be a time lag between
higher level of damages and the timing of an inspection. This is particularly true when using
monthly data, with plants having to self-report their production and discharges data on a
monthly basis.
3.  Empirical results
We have first estimated different combinations of the control variables to account
for  regional  effects  (REGIONAL  DUMMIES  and  INSPREG)  and  time  (YEARLY
DUMMIES and TIME TREND). With respect to regional effects, REGIONAL DUMMIES
appeared to be never significant while INSPREG was always statistically significant. We
thus present results using INSPREG. With respect to time, both YEARLY DUMMIES and
14  There is no plant in our sample that had more than one inspection in a given month.
We have tested a probit model with fixed effects (unconstrained model) by adding
45 dummies for plants, 11 dummies for months, and 6 dummies for years. None
of these variables were statistically significant. We have also conducted a test of
maximum likelihood. Results have shown  that the unconstrained model was not
preferable to the constrained version presented here.
12TIME TREND were not significant. However, models with YEARLY DUMMIES were
always performing better and we therefore keep this specification (results from various
specifications are presented in Appendix 1).
Results are presented in Table 2. The first specification is a version analogous to
Deily and Gray (1991) omitting the variables that capture the damage of pollution. the result
of  our  basic  model. The  following specifications include various  lags  of  the  FLOW
variable: FLOWt  (2); FLOWt-l (3); FLOWt- 2 (4); FLOWt- 3 (5); FLOWt4 (6). Results show
that the explanatory power of the model is relatively high with a percentage of correct
predictions above 80%. For the purpose of our discussion, we will focus on the last four
specifications which offer the largest percentage of correct predictions.'6
First note that the AGE variable is never significant and that its sign is unstable. To
the extent that this variable may be use as a proxy for the cost of compliance, this result
would indicate that the regulator does not consider compliance costs when allocating its
monitoring resources across plants. It is interesting to note that Deily and Gray (1996)
obtain a result of a  similar nature. With respect to  the variables pertaining to  LOCAL
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, we observe that the coefficient of the EMPL variable is
always positive and statistically significant thus indicating that the more important the plant
is in the local labor market, or in other words the more "visible" is the plant, the greater the
probability of inspections: an increase of 1% in the variable EMPL increases the probability
of inspection by 0.1135 %.  As  pointed out earlier, Deily and Gray (1991) obtained a
contrary result. We explain this difference by noting that Deily and Gray included in their
analysis (added  together)  both  monitoring  and  enforcement  activities  while  we  here
consider solely the impact of monitoring activities. If enforcement activities mainly explain
the result obtained by Deily and Gray, the combination of our results with theirs would
indicate that the regulator undertakes monitoring activities where its actions may be most
visible  (thus  indicating  an  inclination to  protect  environmental  quality),  but  remains
16  For these specifications, we have also tested a logit version of the model. Results
were of a similar nature and the percentage of correct predictions almost identical.
13reluctant to impose enforcement actions on those some plants which may be more adept at
challenging the regulator or, as suggested by Deily and Gray, whose closure would be most
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(0.0173)  (0.0437)  (0.0119)  (0.0118)  (0.0036)  (0.0020)  (0.0022)  (0.0007)  (0.0094)
AGE  0.00186  -0.0023  -0.00107  -0.00139  0.00002  0.00025  0.00063  0.00062  -0.00048
(0.3473)  (0.2911)  (0.6209)  (0.5202)  (0.9915)  (0.9118)  (0.7940)  (0.7969)  (0.8528)
UNEMPL  -0.0670  -0.0603  -0.0561  -0.0597  -0.0536  -0.0456  -0.0480  -0.0448  -0.0676
(0.0056)  (0.0363)  (0.0481)  (0.0346)  (0.0624)  (0.1214)  (0.1085)  (0.1350)  (0.0230)
EMPL  0.0225  0.0242  0.0239  0.0219  0.0230  0.0218  0.0213  0.0224  0.0233
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0011)  (0.0019)  (0.0012)  (0.0004)
COMPTSS  0.0154  0.0196  0.0233  0.0221  0.0271  0.0214  0.0234  0.0217  0.0245
(0.3342)  (0.2738)  (0.1974)  (0.2174)  (0.1439)  (0.2509)  (0.2167)  (0.2479)  (0.1975)
COMPBOD  -0.0154  -0.00691  -0.0094  -0.0102  -0.0135  -0.0198  -0.0217  -0.0246  -0.0228
(0.3342)  (0.6727)  (0.5733)  (0.5337)  (0.4284)  (0.0255)  (0.2257)  (0.1804)  (0.2067)
INSPREG  0.3581  0.3520  0.3397  0.3369  0.3392  0.3520  0.3649  0.3760  0.3653
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
INCOME  -9.4E-6  -0.00001  -9.17E-6  -6.7E-6  -3.9E-6  6.42E-7  -8.16E-9  0.000013  6.75E-6
(0.5968)  (0.4511)  (0.6326)  (0.7262)  (0.8378)  (0.9742)  (0.9997)  (0.5507)  (0.7584)
YEAR85  0.1629  0.1789  0.2281  0.2018  0.3344  0.3130  0.2941  0.3005  0.2308
(0.5346)  (0.5146)  (0.4072)  (0.4645)  (0.2323)  (0.2734)  (0.3107)  (0.2998)  (0.4235)
YEAR86  -0.0768  -0.1290  -0.1062  -0.0875  -0.1042  -0.0500  -0.0574  -0.00971  -00.625
(0.7481)  (0.6019)  (0.6653)  (0.7201)  (0.6732)  (0.8431)  (0.8216)  (0.9698)  (0.9807)
YEAR87  0.0737  0.0943  0.0769  0.0808  0.0694  0.1376  0.1465  0.1561  0.1869
(0.7705)  (0.7144)  (0.7642)  (0.7517)  (0.7873)  (0.6010)  (0.5792)  (0.5592)  (0.4817)
YEAR89  -0.1254  -0.2421  -0.2721  -0.2765  -0.3208  -0.2521  -0.2529  -0.2523  -0.2591
(0.6642)  (0.4364)  (0.3782)  (0.3684)  (0.3098)  (0.4316)  (0.4343)  (0.4362)  (0.4241)
YEAR90  -0.2076  -0.1985  -0.2114  -0.2134  -0.2645  -0.2547  -0.2960  -0.3261  -0.3150
(0.3848)  (0.4159)  (0.3864)  (0.3817)  (0.2857)  (0.3240)  (0.2620)  (0.2209)  (0.2402)
YEAR91  0.0750  0.0553  0.00926  0.00369  -0.0202  -0.0711  -0.0729  -0.1483  -0.0737
(0.7740)  (0.8425)  (0.9732)  (0.9893)  (0.9414)  (0.8076)  (0.8053)  (0.6252)  (0.8068)
FLOW  -9.1933  2.0440  1.7193  8.8449  9.2607  11.1915  11.2020  14.5539
(0.1770)  (0.6173)  (0.6823)  (0.0081)  (0.0050)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)
ORGANO  -0.0239  -0.1123  -0.1075
(0.8925)  (0.5496)  (0.5653)





predictions  81.2%  80.6%  80.5%  80.0%  83.1%  83.6%  83.9%  85.2%  84.0%
14The coefficient of our variable UNEMPL is as expected of a negative sign, and
statistically significant for most specifications: the larger the level of unemployment in a
region,  the  smaller  the  probability of  inspections.  Deily  and  Gray  (1991)  somewhat
surprisingly obtained the converse result. They explain their result by suggesting that "to
the extent that high-unemployment areas tend to be more populous or more polluted, the
benefits from reducing emissions in such areas may be greater" (p. 270).
With respect to the variables capturing the impact of DAMAGE OF POLLUTION,
the coefficient of the variable FLOW is positive as we predicted using the public interest
theory of regulation, and is  statistically significant when the variable is lagged 3 or 4
periods: an increase of 1% in the value of the ratio increase the probability of inspections by
0.00089. The maximization of  social welfare would indeed indicate that plants whose
discharges  may  create  higher  environmental  damages  face  a  higher  probability  of
inspections. We cannot clearly explain why only the lagged value of the FLOW variable is
significant. We note however that there is typically a period of a few months between the
time  when plants  submit their  discharge reports  and  the  time  when  this  information
becomes available to local enforcers for actions.
Coefficients of the variables INCOME and ORGANO are never significant. The
coefficient on the variable POPAVAL is unexpectedly negative and in most circumstances
not significant. This indicates to us that a more precise proxy for the potential damages
caused by a plant's effluent would need to be developed in order to test more precisely the
impact of damages on monitoring activities. In this particular instance, we suggest that the
use of the portion of each river along which pulp and paper plants are discharging should be
precisely documented and analysed.
The variable capturing the number of months that the plant was in compliance with
BOD  environmental standards  in  the previous  12 months, COMPBOD,  is  sometimes
significant with the expected negative sign: a greater frequency of non-compliance with
BOD standards increases the probability of inspections. However, the variable COMPTSS
15has  an  unexpected positive  sign but  is  never  significant. This  may  suggest that  the
performance of a plant with respect to  BOD is more likely to  influence the regulator's
behavior than its performance with respect to TSS (a similar result is found in Laplante and
Rilstone (1996)). It also suggests that inspections are not purely random and that they tend
to  be concentrated where  non-compliance (with BOD  standards) is more important, as
suggested by Silverman (1990).
This evidence suggests that both the public interest theory of regulation and the
economic theory of regulation contribute to explain the decision of the regulator to monitor
the  environmental performance of  regulated plants.  In  a  sense,  such  results  indicate
pragmatically that both theories may be complementary, or that the "real" world is neither
totally black or totally white. This contrasts with the results presented by Kaserman et al.
(1993) whose empirical test strongly supports the economic theory of regulation.
4.  Conclusion
Though environmental regulations impose uniform standards on plants that are
facing heterogeneous local conditions (such as environmental damages and labor market
conditions),  results  in  this  paper  suggest  that  the  monitoring  of  those  standards  is
responsive to this heterogeneity. Ceteris paribus, plants whose emissions are most likely
to impose high environmental damages are facing a higher probability of being inspected;
similarly, the probability of an inspection appears to  be  an increasing function of the
visibility of the plant and a decreasing function of  the regional unemployment rate. We
do believe that these results offer important insights into the regulator's behavior. First, it
does suggest that regulators, facing limited resources, do not  blindly enforce uniform
standards as set and  required by environmental regulation: ceteris paribus,  monitoring
effort is likely to be higher where environmental damages are higher. This result would
suggest that it may be less costly to set (sub-optimal) uniform standards and let enforcers
take care of the specificities of local conditions, instead of setting standards that reflect
those specificities  and letting no room to  the enforcers to deviate from the standards.
Secondly, we have shown that regulators do respond to both the visibility of the plant in
16the region as well as local labor market conditions. This result complements the result
obtained  by  Deily  and  Gray  (1991):  regulators  appear  to  monitor  larger  plants  for
visibility of their actions (and thus satisfy a subset of the electorate), but avoid enforcing
the regulation for those larger plants (thus satisfying another subset of the electorate).
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